The Ungrateful Nation Strikes Back!

General Elections of 1983

The military administration led by general Kenan Evren designed a two-party political system, where two military-friendly parties would superficially represent the country's left- and right-wing ideologies. The party on the right, Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), was in the leadership of the retired general Turgut Sunalp, and the party on the left, the Populist Party (HP), was led by Necdet Calp, a bureaucrat.

Stealing the elections was not going to be a big deal, since the pre-coup era political parties were to remain banned throughout the pseudo-democratic process (as well as in the years to come), and new applications were to be rejected. The military, however, made one exception for Turgut Özal, the US-educated former deputy prime minister who also served in the military administration as a civilian state minister responsible of the economy.

Özal was fully aware of the intentions of the junta, as well as the reason why they allowed him to form a party. He later on said he knew all along that the soldiers believed he wouldn't be able to get even a paltry 10% of the vote. His Motherland Party (ANAP) was simply the junta's proof of democracy, or a 'garnish on the menu,' as Özal put it.

As the months passed by, and the election date drew closer, however, the military leaders realized that they made a big mistake. Because, the general public increasingly sided with the 'civilian' Özal, and not with the arrogant Sunalp, who continuously and unintentionally ridiculed himself as he talked to the press. In a last effort to impact the outcome, coup leader Evren addressed the public two days before the election, and strongly implied that they should vote for Sunalp, and not for Özal. But in the end, to everyone's surprise, Özal scored a major victory by winning 45% of all votes. Sunalp came as the third with only 23%.

The people had refused to do as the coup leader told them.

How the Turkish History Repeated Itself in 2007

Shortly after coming to power in 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) introduced somewhat revolutionary reforms "ranging from improved civil liberties and human rights to enhanced civilian control of the military," as the European Commission stated in its 2004 Regular Report on Turkey. The reforms altogether constituted a major deviation from the country's Kemalist political tradition. The ban on the Kurdish language was lifted; certain restrictions on the right of non-violent expression of opinion were abolished; military representatives in the Board of High Education (which oversees the universities) and the Superior Board of Radio and Television (which oversees the mass audiovisual media) were removed; the principle of the primacy of international human rights conventions over domestic law was adopted; the authority of military courts were restricted so as not to try civilians for offences related to criticizing the military; and the National Security Council was brought under stronger civilian control.

The legal reforms were brought about in an effort to adapt the Turkish political system to that of the EU. Reducing the military influence and control, and thus protecting civil liberties was therefore the paramount issue all along.

Once deprived of some of the political powers it long enjoyed, the military obviously had every reason to try and reverse the process. Unwilling to remain in the barracks, the military "continue[d] to exercise influence through a series of informal channels" despite the newly-enacted legal restrictions, the European Commission's 2004 Regular Report on Turkey also acknowledged. Moreover, the retired army members established a number of non-governmental organizations, started registering thousands of people, and, in some cases, organized ceremonies where they pledged to kill traitors. This neo-nationalist (ulusalcı) network also engaged in grassroots efforts in order to influence the public opinion against the EU and the AKP.

The implicit efforts of the military and the explicit efforts of the neo-nationalists reflected on the political arena throughout the first half of 2007.

March 2007: An internal memorandum of the military that indexed Turkish journalists as either pro- or anti-military leaked to the press. Three weeks later, a 2000-page alleged memoir of the retired naval forces commander that revealed detailed coup plans of some generals also leaked to the press.

April 2007: Hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Ankara in a public demonstration organized by the pro-military neo-nationalist networks to protest the AKP and the prospective presidential candidacy of an AKP member (April 14th). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the presidential candidacy of Abdullah Gül, the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Prime Minister (April 24th). The Turkish Armed Forces issued an ultimatum on its official web site, harshly criticizing the AKP, also implying the threat of an actual coup (April 27th). The neo-nationalist network organized the second leg of its anti-AKP demonstration in İstanbul (April 29th).

May 2007: Introducing an unprecedented requirement, the Constitutional Court declared the first round of presidential elections unconstitutional, creating a strong impression that it made an arbitrary decision (May 1st). The Prime Minister announced early general elections (May 2nd). The neo-nationalist network organized a third demonstration, this time in the city of İzmir (May 13th).

June 2007: Evidence linked some of the neo-nationalist groups to recent high-profile murders and attempted bombings.

As of July 2007, it was highly visible that Turkey once again entered a pre-election calm where the state/military indicated the general public to vote against a certain political party. The demonstrations, which, according to the anti-AKP groups, attracted two to three million people in each of the three major cities strengthened the view that there would be a visible increase in the votes for the Republican People's Party (CHP), which represented the state's official ideology.

It did not happen.

46% of the popular vote went to the AKP, indicating a sharp increase from 34% in 2002.

The people, once again, disagreed with the generals.

The Ungrateful Nation

The dichotomy between the state and the people has always been a major phenomenon in the republican-era Turkish politics. It is not a rare case for the members of the so-called republican elite to accuse the general public with illiteracy, bigotry or shortsightedness. İsmet İnönü, the second president of Turkey, is reported to have reacted to the humiliating loss he suffered in the general elections by saying, 'Ungrateful Nation!' - (nankör millet). This was in 1950, the year which the Turkish people finally had the chance to bring about the electoral downfall of the state-party. The die-hard republican elite still call it 'the counter-revolution.'

After 57 years, the 'elite reaction' to the will of the people remains pretty much the same. After the general elections of 2007, Onur Öymen, the deputy head of the Republican People's Party, claimed that the election results were 'irrational.' Erdal Atabek, a columnist in the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Daily asked, 'What percent of the voters are really able to use their minds?' Finally, Özgür Çakmak, who unsuccessfully ran for MP within the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) ranks said, 'I have travelled the whole world, but never came across such a characterless people.'

Despite all the arrogance, sensible voices are getting increasingly more common in Turkey. Professor Murat Belge, who has published a large volume of articles about the influence of the state-inflicted militarism on the Turkish people, wrote in the left-wing Radikal Daily: 'Whenever it had the chance to make a 'choice,' this society always made the right one: In 1950, in 1973, in 1983, and now.' But, more importantly, he also quoted Abraham Lincoln: 'You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.'